Democracy Not an Asian Value?

The east-west debate on democracy is a battlefield of opposing views. On one side, we have the Western belief in liberal democracy and the rights of the individual as necessary ingredients for successful nation-building; on the other, we have an Eastern perspective that disagrees and maintains that traditional ‘Asian values’, such as discipline and national cooperation, must be respected as the most important elements in the development of an Asian country. Both these views have their own virtues. However, we need to find a way to arbitrate amongst them. Which view is closest to reality? How can we apply it to the question of nation-building, or what is the right way to build a viable state?

Proponents of authoritarian rule, such as Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, use the notion of ‘Asian values’ to support an Asian exceptionalist movement that resists the influence of Western liberal democratic thinking. Of course, the discerning observer can see the political motives underneath such claims. Amartya Sen is one strong critic of the ‘Asian values’, arguing that there is nothing implicit in Asian philosophy that favours authoritarianism over democracy and individualism. Indeed, within the diversity of both Eastern and Western philosophical thoughts, one can find evidence to support both democracy and authoritarianism. For example, Indian Vedic philosophy and Confucianist teaching do in fact raise the importance of tolerance between individuals (versus conformism), as well as the need to do what is right regardless of the views of the authority.
On the other hand, as an Asian, it is not difficult to see why the Asian way of thinking might lead to an emphasis on obedience and discipline over individual liberties. Confucianist filial piety, for example, dictates that people must respect and obey their elders almost without exception. This familial practice carries easily over to civil society and state institutions. East Asian elites have little trouble converting this concept into a form of legitimization, presenting themselves as the elders of the state. And such a concept places the bounds of duty on a deeply individual level, having more hold on the Asian citizen than the Western concept of the divine right of distant kings had on the average peasant.

In this light, the attitudes of a people under certain cultural and social conditions, even if they are influenced by interest groups, matter more than the actual philosophy that influenced the development of their culture and society. Amartya Sen is right in saying that Eastern philosophy does not oppose individualism, but philosophical questions do not directly affect the political attitudes of the people. In this context, we can see that it is more of a question of Western versus Eastern trends. The development of individualism and liberal democracy in the West can be traced back to the revolutionary changes brought about by the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Asia has not experienced such a paradigmatic shift. What average individuals have known and lived with for centuries is the caste system in India or political piety in East Asia, and this is bound to colour their views in favour of the traditional systems for a long time to come.

The different views in the East-West debate are often used to lend support to theories of nation-building. Pro-authoritarian figures in Asia present ‘Asian values’ as the correct guide for the development of a politically and economically viable Asian state. Indeed, examples abound in Asia where strong states that work for good of all rather than the individual are successful, such as South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew. In contrast, one struggles to find even a single example where liberal democracy is the direct contributor to the development of a successful state, and this includes the Western world. Even the USA, which takes pride in having the oldest existing Constitution in the world, cannot attribute its success to liberal democracy itself. Rather, it was due to the lack of a landowning class and the resultant (as Alexis de Tocqueville calls it) “middling” values of hard work and the pursuit of wealth, coupled with territorial expansion and industrialisation.

However, critics point out that politically motivated post-colonial rhetoric tends to borrow such an argument because of its resistance towards Western values, leading to many dictators adopting similar lines to justify their regimes, thus severely affecting its respectability.  Yet this does not mean that we can simply dismiss it.
Consider the issues of international aid and state development in Africa and the Middle East. Developed Western countries continually insist on liberal democracy, with its inherent dogmatism towards individual liberties, as a prerequisite for the construction of a viable state. They often attach conditions pertaining to it in granting aid to, or in determining relations with, developing countries.

This is a bold maxim that even some of the most influential Western liberal thinkers clearly did not agree with. John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, stated their scepticism about imposing democracy on people that are ‘not ready’ for it. And there are historical precedents in the West itself that point to the serious consequences of the failure of democracy under difficult conditions, namely the rise of Fascism and Nazism. If it was the case in Europe that weak democracies could fail and produce something worse than simply the lack of democracy, what says it could not happen in Asia, Africa or the Middle East? And, ultimately, Western nations have to ask themselves whether their insistence on democratic reforms has been productive in the developing world.

The conclusion we can draw from the concept of Western versus Eastern trends dovetails with this idea of being ‘ready’ or ‘not ready’ for democracy.  When we discuss democratic reforms in developing countries, we need to look at local trends for indicators on whether the institution of liberal democracy is supported by historical and cultural conditions, or whether the people are ‘ready’ for it. Imposing democracy on an unsuitable socio-political terrain would only generate resentment and cause a backlash that might render the situation worse. Of course, this line of thinking does entail implications that are difficult to stomach; it might seem too consequentialist or even ruthless. But if the aim is to build viable states in fragile regions in the world, political actors have to make difficult decisions. Unfortunately, the trouble in many countries is they are all too happy to do so, leading to the other extreme of the political spectrum. Therefore, in the spirit of Eastern philosophy, the right way is the middle way – not a dictatorship, but a strong and enlightened leadership.

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Moses Lemuel is a first year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.